



ILLiad TN: 1224852

Title: Logics of genocide : the structures of violence and the contemporary world /

Call #: NO_RESULTS

Volume:

Location: NO_RESULTS

Issue:

Month/Year: 2020

Pages: 36-57

Author:

Article/Chapter Title: The Friend of War and Genocide

Imprint:

<https://www.google.com/books/edition/Log>



This document was scanned from the Northwestern University Library collection. If you have questions or comments regarding your scanned document, please contact us at ill-request@northwestern.edu, or call (847) 491-7630.

COPYRIGHT STATEMENT: U.S. copyright law (*Title 17, United States Code*) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be "used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research." If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excess of "fair use," that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law.

Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy

Philosophical Perspectives on Contemporary Ireland
Edited by Clara Fischer and Áine Mahon

Inference and Consciousness
Edited by Anders Nes with Timothy Chan

The Complex Reality of Pain
Jennifer Corns

Perception and Reality in Kant, Husserl, and McDowell
Corijn van Mazijk

Social Functions in Philosophy
Metaphysical, Normative, and Methodological Perspectives
Edited by Rebekka Hufendiek, Daniel James, and Raphael van Riel

Microaggressions and Philosophy
Edited by Lauren Freeman and Jeanine Weekes Schroer

Cross-Tradition Engagement in Philosophy
A Constructive-Engagement Account
Bo Mou

Perception and the Inhuman Gaze
Perspectives from Philosophy, Phenomenology, and the Sciences
Edited by Anya Daly, Fred Cummins, James Jardine, and Dermot Moran

Logics of Genocide
The Structures of Violence and the Contemporary World
Edited by Anne O'Byrne and Martin Shuster

For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/Routledge-Studies-in-Contemporary-Philosophy/book-series/SE0720

Logics of Genocide

The Structures of Violence and the Contemporary World

Edited by Anne O'Byrne
and Martin Shuster

 **Routledge**
Taylor & Francis Group
NEW YORK AND LONDON

First published 2020
by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017

and by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2020 selection and editorial matter, Anne O'Byrne and Martin Shuster; individual chapters, the contributors

The right of Anne O'Byrne and Martin Shuster to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Names: O'Byrne, Anne E. (Anne Elizabeth), 1966– editor. | Shuster, Martin, editor.

Title: Logics of genocide : the structures of violence and the contemporary world / edited by Anne O'Byrne and Martin Shuster.
Description: New York : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Routledge studies in contemporary philosophy | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2020015621 (print) | LCCN 2020015622 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367511005 (hbk) | ISBN 9781003056614 (ebk)

Subjects: LCSH: Genocide—Philosophy.

Classification: LCC HV6322.7 .L64 2019 (print) |

LCC HV6322.7 (ebook) | DDC 304.6/6301—dc23

LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2020015621>

LC ebook record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2020015622>

ISBN: 978-0-367-51100-5 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-003-05661-4 (ebk)

Typeset in Sabon
by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

<i>Acknowledgement</i>	viii
<i>Preface</i>	ix
DONALD BLOXHAM	
Introduction	1
ANNE O'BYRNE AND MARTIN SHUSTER	
PART I	
Agency and Institutions	17
1 Hegel and State Homogenization	19
MARTIN SHUSTER	
2 The Friends of War and Genocide	36
JACQUELINE STEVENS	
3 The "Criminal" and the Crime of Genocide	58
LISSA SKITOLSKY	
4 Genocide and Agency in the Americas: Methodological Considerations	78
ROCÍO ZAMBRANA	
PART II	
Bodies and Beyond	93
5 Generational Being	95
ANNE O'BYRNE	

2 The Friends of War and Genocide

Jacqueline Stevens

This essay reviews the resigned acceptance and even full-throated embrace of war throughout European political thought, before lingering in the time and work of Hannah Arendt. The purpose is to explore the responsibility of political theorists who embrace the nation and see genocide, but not war, as evil. Can we continue to dignify the categorical distinction Arendt and others make between war and genocide—explicitly purposed to excuse the perpetrators of the former from judicial judgment—as a matter of polite disagreement? Is it possible that Arendt and her allies, by supporting the nativists in embracing the nation-state and rationalizing war but not genocide, have made it too easy for our contemporaries to choose the easy solace of her beguiling writing on behalf of commonplace fantasies about the “authentic” nation? Is it possible that they ignore how Arendt’s beliefs—cast as truisms about nationality and diversity—are enemies of humanity, thinking, and imagination?

The first section highlights tensions in Plato’s views on war and reviews portions of the *Politeia* that sustain a very different distinction between friends and enemies than the one on which Arendt and most political scientists, including contemporary political theorists, rely. Books I and VIII, in particular, invite revisiting the use of friends-enemies to reference alliances based on one’s nationality. In Book I, Socrates proposes instead that friends are those who pursue truth and justice, and suggests that any existential commitments only be made on their behalf, while condemning enmities based on differences of ancestry or sovereignty. The second section of this chapter makes use of Plato’s heuristics to pose questions about the distinction between supposedly new and old wars that arise throughout Arendt’s oeuvre. After reviewing Arendt’s naturalization of the nation and its violence, I propose in section III that it is just these efforts, mostly implied and not as explicit as in Arendt’s work, that fuel the inherently unconstrained fantasies of conquest and destruction that Hitler shared with Athens’ mid-fifth century BC First Citizen (and General) Pericles as much as with the Spanish Conquistador Hernan Cortez, who shared with Don Quixote inspiration from Amadis de Gaul, a fictional knight whose chivalrous code of honor Arendt invokes

as a rationale for warfare or *polémos* (the Greek term that refers to *war* and also the god of war). The chapter concludes by reflecting on the responsibility of intellectuals for the misshapen ideas that rationalize war today, including by attempting to distinguish its evils from those of genocide. If, as Arendt states, in war those who plan the deaths of others and thus are the furthest removed from killing are the ones who are the most responsible, should we not be considering the complicity of her and most intellectuals who aggrandize the nation and its fables and who thus ensure war’s persistence?

I. Friends and Enemies in Plato’s *Politeia*

Going back to Homer’s *Iliad*, we see war epitomized as the apex of tragic and therefore necessary stupidity, a fact of nature (*physis*). Choruses have shared this view with substantial majorities of the common folk throughout history. The works of antiquity—mythical and historical—are populated by ancient kings and leaders who dangle before gullible men promises of war’s bounty: riches, sexual conquest, and, especially sought for, honor and its remembrance. Even (especially?) Socrates, before the Athenian jury, asserts proof of his virtue in his brave military service on behalf of Athenian colonialism.¹ The logic of many of the famous massacres, from the *Iliad* through Xenophon’s *Anabasis*, were not attributed to the calculations or miscalculations by the individual generals issuing orders, but to the gods whispering in their ears, exhorting them, acting behind the scenes, or failing to intervene, any one of which could itself be attributed to a motive for the god that was benign or to a petty grievance or simply a distraction. There was no responsibility, only luck, and that could change as quickly as the wind.

But what happens after the gods have slumbered and the democratic chorus controls war’s destiny? On what grounds would they, the citizens running their own governments, fight? By what standards would the war decisions of their political and military leaders be assessed? As people today continue to find themselves fleeing from war’s threat and ruins, not among the millions but among their loved ones, friends, and strangers made newly familiar, the unsolved and often poorly asked question of war’s meaning remains.

It is not until the *Politeia* that we first encounter a philosopher more or less systematically questioning war’s conventional foundations and legitimacy.² Tensions in the *Politeia* on the topic of friends, enemies, and war have received scant attention thus far, perhaps because they reflect the unexamined nature of contradictory views of war that are still prevalent.³ These tensions between the disinterested pursuit of truth and justice and the partisan pursuit of victory in conflicts decided by brute force warrant explication here because they crystallize the problem with Hannah Arendt’s illiberal and even anti-liberal defense of the nation, and because

these rather glaring tensions continue to be largely ignored, raising questions about why, with rare exceptions, political theorists have been shunting aside Plato's challenges to their complacency with war.⁴

This is not to imply that Plato's views on war are more denotative and self-evident than his thoughts on the other fraught political topics the text explores. Books 5 and 8 contain passages suggesting Plato saw war the same way Thucydides saw it—as an enterprise that might bring out the best in Athenian democracy and its citizens.⁵ Book 8 opens with Socrates stating:

We are agreed then, Glaucon, that the state which is to achieve the height of good government must have community of wives and children and all education, and also that . . . the rulers or kings over them are to be those who have approved themselves the best in both war [*polemos*] and philosophy.⁶

Not only is expertise in war elevated to the stature of philosophy, but here it is given a priority, at least in being referenced first.⁷

The philosopher kings in Book 8, as opposed to those in Book I, delineate their alliances and adversaries along the lines of the "authentic" friends and enemies that Arendt, following G.W.F. Hegel and Carl Schmitt, will defend in her attack on Karl Jaspers and other critics of the nation. These passages concern how one treats those who are Athenians' "enemies by nature" (non-Greeks, or barbarians) and those who "are still by nature the friends of Greeks" even at war, but whom fight among themselves when "Greece is sick . . . and divided by faction."⁸ In the case of the former, "the Greeks being lovers of Greeks," war should be avoided. The motive is a natural-seeming, if arbitrary, kinship.⁹ Indeed, Plato appears to indulge xenophobia. Socrates observes that the Greeks are treating "the barbarians as Greeks now treat Greeks."¹⁰ Instead of treating foreigners as inferiors, the Greeks, alas, Plato complains, are treating those who are by nature different as though they are (as good as) Greeks.¹¹ These passages seem to suggest Plato's endorsement of the conventional view that war is acceptable, as long as the cleavages oppose Greeks and non-Greeks, thus falling along fault lines of ancestry and sovereignty, not unlike the logic of friends and enemies that resonates today for, say, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and those outside it.¹²

And yet, the *Politeia* offers other views on war, friends, and enemies that will also sound familiar to contemporary readers, and that stand in direct contradiction with those reviewed previously. From its opening lines, Book I's main purpose seems to be questioning the conventions of patriotism, militarism, and friendship informed by the texts and conventions of his that era, and indeed our own. In the second sentence, Socrates observes of a new Athenian festival, "I thought the procession of the citizens very fine, but it was no better than the show made by the marching of the Thracian contingent."¹³ Either as a device to ridicule or simply note

the ubiquity of patriotism, the comment deflates the story of Athenian greatness before it has even begun. Imagine opening a narrative portending to elevate the United States to even more lofty heights with a comment comparing the portion of a military parade staged by US citizens with a unit of legal residents from Canada that was just as fine. And then imagine beginning the actual instruction of one's compatriots by taking down one's country's chief weapons manufacturer, and in his own home at that—as does Socrates by first noting Cephalus seemed "much aged" and then saying to his face that he seemed "very aged," and then mocking his—the first—definition of justice: "not remaining in debt."¹⁴ In short, the *Politeia* opens by disparaging a self-serving framework for retributive justice as a scheme for the creditor class that is so clueless about justice that it arms people and goes to war indiscriminately.¹⁵

In Book I, after minimizing Athenian displays of patriotism, and suggesting the rich guy who made money from war looks old, Socrates goes on to attack the presence of weapons in the hands of mad men and thus to assail the values of the oligarchic arms merchant:

if one took over weapons from a friend who was in his right mind and then the lender should go mad and demand them back, that we ought not return them in that case and that he who did so return them would not be acting justly—nor yet would he who chose to speak nothing but the truth to one who was in that state?¹⁶

Cephalus departs, but the Athenian national pastime of war-mongering suffers another attack when Polemarchus, Cephalus's son, proposes the second definition of justice: "that which renders benefits and harms to friends and enemies," or, as Socrates paraphrases, "To do good to friends and evil to enemies."¹⁷ The dichotomy of friends and enemies immediately evokes the context of war and thus a syllogism that, Socrates explains, would require that the just man be that individual "making war as an ally," i.e., as a friend.¹⁸ And yet, war, Socrates points out, is inherently episodic and thus its antagonists are ephemeral. Therefore, they are inconsistent with the characteristic demand of justice, that its qualities persist across contexts, including those of peace.¹⁹ When Polemarchus, a warlord's son, persists in saying "justice benefits friends and harms enemies," Socrates presses him on the conventional meaning of these alliances.²⁰

Here are the three problems with these passages for the sort of war that Socrates prepares the guardians for in Book V: (1) One's apparent friends, perhaps Greeks, are bad and deserve to be harmed, not defended. ("It will work out, then, for many, Polemarchus, who have misjudged men that it is just to harm their friends, for they have got bad ones, and to benefit their enemies, for they are good.")²¹ (2) The criteria for friends and enemies are the good and the bad, not national allegiances: "the friend will be the good man and the bad the enemy."²² (3) Therefore, the use of force on behalf of friends is as likely to thwart injustice as to

ensure it rapidly seeds and propagates. ("We then said it was just to do good to a friend and evil to an enemy, but now we are to add that it is just to benefit the friend if he is good and harm the enemy if he is bad?")²³

Moreover, consistent with the initial metaphor of the physician as the just guardian, Socrates concludes Book I with a categorical rejection of, if not all violence, at least that of the largest part of Athenian wars:

If, then, anyone affirms that it is just to render to each his due and he means by this that injury and harm is what is due to his enemies from the just man and benefits to his friends, he was no truly wise man who said it. For what he meant was not true. *For it has been made clear to us that in no case is it just to harm anyone.*²⁴

Socrates is not categorically condemning all violence. Perhaps violence to deter future individual conduct that is unjust might benefit the person punished. But this is not about criminal punishment of individual actions. Nor is Socrates anticipating any Augustinian rationale of using force to save souls. War as conveyed in the *Politeia* conforms with the context of Greek antiquity. War instrumentalizes foreign countries to obtain property and slaves, not to ennoble anyone, especially those who would out of necessity suffer physical injury or death for reasons that had nothing to do with their own character or, for the most part, that of the regimes of which they were a part. Socrates attributes to "Periander or Perdicas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban or some other rich man who had great power in his own conceit" the view that it is "just to benefit friends and harm enemies," and thus proposes that the normal battle lines of ancient Greece are drawn by the power lust of oligarchs, and are not based on any principle of justice.²⁵

These tensions are perplexing. If there is an axiomatic identity politics shot through our political societies, such that Athenians are always our friends, and ideally, all Greeks as well (470a-471a, discussed previously), and if combatants fighting on this basis deserve honors (e.g., Book 5), then why does Plato hold out as an exception the leader who is an enemy because he is bad, not Persian, for instance, and war that is harmful and not ennobling? Why does he fail to tackle this question head on, similar to Socrates in "The Apology," or not resolve these tensions along the lines taken up later, as we shall see, by G.W.F. Hegel or Carl Schmitt, who traces his own views on friends and enemies to Book V of Plato's *Politeia*?²⁶

II. Immanuel Kant and Henry David Thoreau: Perpetual Peace Versus Abolishing War

The multiple positions on war in Plato's *Politeia* anticipate reflections on the subject in much later times. Socrates' point that citizens in

democracies would not tolerate a leader who started wars to augment his own power is taken up by Immanuel Kant, who believed that his age had succeeded in bringing the people out of Plato's cave. Enlightened, and with a republican constitution, they would never be suckered into war in the first place:

If (as must inevitably be the case, given this form of constitution) the consent of the citizenry is required in order to determine whether or not there will be war, it is natural that they consider all the calamities before committing themselves to so risky a game.²⁷

The threat to their personal wellbeing as soldiers and additional taxes could never, Kant wagers, entice them to assent.²⁸ How has that bet pay off? In the relatively short history of republican governments, Kant is clearly the loser. Perpetual peace requires more than a republican constitution.

Indeed, political theorists writing after Kant, including the vast majority of so-called liberals, have largely repudiated Kant's desired goal, not just its means. Hegel mocked it outright: "War is the spirit and the form in which the essential moment of the ethical substance, the absolute freedom of the ethical self from every existential form, is present in its actual and authentic existence."²⁹ In war, the individual realizes his identity is fully merged with a greater power; as this state is sovereign and free to rampage and exercise its will without restraint, so too is the citizen who, willing to risk his own life, is so absorbed by this power as to realize his own freedom through the independence of the state.

The first writer of whom I am aware that advanced the position that most concerned Hegel was Henry David Thoreau. Less than three decades after the *Philosophy of Right* appeared in 1821, Thoreau connected his opposition to war and slavery with the development of democracy into anarchy:

The progress from an absolute to a limited monarchy, from a limited monarchy to a democracy, is a progress toward a true respect of the individual . . . Is a democracy, such as we know it, the last improvement possible in government? . . . There will never be a really free and enlightened State, until the State comes to recognize the individual as a higher and independent power, from which all its own power and authority are derived, and treats him accordingly.³⁰

This notion that the individual is the irreducible object and source of justice is a far cry from the objects of statecraft we encounter not only in Plato's *Politeia* and Hegel's *Staat*, in which the equation of the rational and the actual precludes individual skepticism of state policy, but also in Kant's anthropological narrative in which democrats reject war because

it is expensive and on someone else's behalf, not because, as Thoreau will explain, it is unjust to kill a stranger simply because he is a stranger and a government instructs you to do so.

Not only did the British empire falsify Kant's psychologically informed hypothesis about representative democracies, the very philosophers who might have been expected to advance Kant's pragmatic arguments had little to say explicitly on the subject of war while implicitly defending the use of force to defend the expansion of England's dominion around the world. In arguing against pragmatic conformity with government policies, first appearing in Locke and then reprised by Paley ("the justice of every particular case of resistance is reduced to a computation of the quantity of the danger and grievance on the one side, and of the probability and expense of resisting it on the other"), Thoreau writes:

But Paley appears never to have contemplated those cases to which the rule of expedience does not apply, in which a people, as well as an individual, must do justice, cost what it may. If I have unjustly wrested a plank from a drowning man, I must restore it to him though I drown myself. This, according to Paley, would be inconvenient. But he that would save his life, in such a case, shall lose it. The people must cease to hold slaves, and to make war on Mexico, *though it cost them their existence as a people.*³¹

This line returns us to Plato's *Politeia*. Both Plato and Thoreau subvert the identity politics of the friend and enemy: in a war fomented by tyrants, albeit elected by majorities, the latter stand against the citizens, though the citizens may not realize it. For Plato and Thoreau, the just individual is friends with those who are good, even if this brings to an end one's compatriots as such, and they, with Thoreau, become part of the Republic of Mexico.

III. Hannah Arendt and Other Friends of War

It is this crystallization of the problem of war—the Hegelian, nationalist state whose righteous existence requires individuals to leave statecraft to the leaders—that brings us to the problem at the heart of this chapter: the notion in international laws and intuitions across all classes worldwide that genocide is always unjust and deserving of concerted, heroic efforts to prevent and condemn, while war is as indifferent to criteria of justice as rain and, much as was the case in the time of Homer, just as impervious to our explicit preferences.

Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (originally published in 1963 and then revised by Arendt in 1965) advances this contrast quite self-consciously. To her credit, Arendt grapples with how to distinguish the nation-state and the wars it engenders from the genocides

whose perpetrators she condemns to death. Arendt never explains why she remains willing to share the world with Harry Truman and not with Eichmann. After all, it was Truman who unleashed the atomic bomb as part of a massive, macabre demonstration project and experiment on hundreds of thousands of innocent residents of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. The use of the bomb had many causes, including an ongoing interest by the military in radiation studies to assess the bomb's utility going forward—inquiries that continued through ongoing research that also might be characterized as manslaughter perpetrated on unwitting subjects in hospitals, army units, and entire communities throughout the world.³² The protocols for dropping the bombs included logistics for studying the mortality rate and effects on survivors and their descendants, which is why the US Human Genome Project had its origins in the Atomic Energy Commission and later the Department of Energy, moving to the National Institutes of Health only in the 1990s.³³ How are the individuals who decide to kill for the purpose of achieving national dominance or racial dominance, and indeed select a racialized target for scientific study in advance suitable companions, but not Eichmann, whose pursued his desire to separate Germans from Jews in close coordination with Jewish ghetto leaders whose interest in an exodus of Jews to Israel—in keeping with their mutual appreciation of Theodor Herzl's tenets for a Jewish state—aligned with Eichmann's?³⁴

Before turning to the axioms about group difference on which Arendt relies in making these heuristic distinctions between war and genocide and appraisals of their relative merits, it is worth reviewing the facts she herself presents that suggest empirical continuities between war and the genocide she rejects. First, although Jews were enslaved by Germans in Nazi work camps and tortured in the name of experimentation, it took the outbreak of the war in the East to initiate the campaign of Jewish extermination. The renunciation of the pact with Stalin, she points out, brings about the "Final Solution":

On June 22, 1941, Hitler launched his attack on the Soviet Union, and six or eight weeks later Eichmann was summoned to Heydrich's office in Berlin. On July 31, Heydrich had received a letter from Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering. . . . The letter commissioned Heydrich to prepare "the general solution [*Gesamtlösung*] of the Jewish question within the area of German influence in Europe."³⁵

Thus, Arendt associates the timing of the mass extermination of the Jewish people in Europe with the opening of the Eastern front. This is important for understanding how the slaughter of Jews was part of the broader war effort and not only, or even primarily, connected to the Nazi government's targeting of Jews in Germany. Due to demographics and timing, the number of Jews from Germany Hitler killed as a result of the

“Final Solution” was between 134,500 and 141,500—a small fraction of the total.³⁶ The Nazi targeting of Jews was closely coordinated with Eastern European and Baltic native forces, and was not done instead of concentrating on the Wehrmacht advance into Russia, but was a means of rallying the troops, so to speak, in a fashion that recalls the opening scenes from Voltaire’s *Candide*.³⁷ When the *Einsatzgruppen* allied themselves with the local forces by organizing the corralling of their Jewish neighbors into ghettos, and the plundering of their homes, wealth, and labor, this was not instead of marching into Russia, as Arendt suggests, but a means of securing territory through the support of anti-Semitic, anti-Communist partisans who had personally benefited from the mass evacuations, slave labor, and redistribution of property.³⁸

Just as ethnically based massacres may be associated with strategic objectives, democratic publics may clamor for vigilante violence targeting racial or national groups during war, with the strategic purpose subordinated to nativist impulses of annihilation. The same month the US dropped the atomic bombs on Japanese civilians, a Gallup poll found 5% of their sample opposed dropping the action, 54% of their sample supported the action, and an additional 23% agreed with the statement “We should have quickly used many more of the bombs before Japan had a chance to surrender,” with US demographics supporting this outcome prompting Paul Boyer to ask, “Did the greater bloodthirstiness of the southwestern states reflect higher levels of anti-Oriental prejudice?”³⁹ Intellectuals contemporary with Arendt characterized the irresponsibility of US leaders behind the bomb as akin to madness that appeared normal.⁴⁰ Louis Mumford wrote in 1948: “If militant genocide does not turn the planet into an extermination camp . . . fear and suspicion may turn it into a madhouse, in which the physicians in charge will be as psychotic as the patients.”⁴¹ Can Arendt sustain the proposition that the Nazi impulse behind targeting Jews for elimination because they were Jews differs categorically from the US public support of massacring Japanese civilians simply because they were Japanese?

Arendt not only recognized the historical connection between the timing of the alliance with Baltic and Slavic militias, in particular, who were unhappy at their colonial status in the Soviet Union, but also recited the hallmarks of the old- and new-fashioned nationalism that informed the Jewish genocide. Again, the facts she includes support a narrative that connects the slaughter of a people with the logic of a nation-state’s war, and not a separate, zero-sum analysis. The militarization of the war and the campaign against Jews helps us understand Jews who escaped being rounded up because of military service to the German government, just as German nationalism informed the crafting of policies for Jewish identification based on the rules of *jus sanguinis*, resembling those Napoleon Bonaparte instituted in 1803 for determining French nationality, not to mention, as Arendt points out, the laws of modern Israel.⁴² The

expatriation of French women who married foreigners, a policy taken up reciprocally by other European countries and the United States in future decades, was also not so different from the 1935 Nuremberg Laws, which expatriated Jews but allowed them to remain in Germany as resident aliens (as would be the case for spouses of foreign husbands throughout Europe in this time frame), and did not recognize mixed marriages, as was the case in the United States in most states until 1967.⁴³ Moreover, the second-class legal status of Jews was a long-standing part of German political culture—requiring those born to Jewish parents to convert if they wanted to become lawyers or serve in government, including as professors—again, part and parcel of the effort to establish a German nation and prevent its cultural watering down into the empty humanism Arendt herself would also oppose.⁴⁴

Finally, Arendt’s effort to single out Eichmann’s reductionist genocidal equation of a group with efforts at the national body’s purification producing Jews, in this case, as biological waste—in contrast with the supposedly more historical and political commitments war entails—overlooks Eichmann’s embrace of Theodor Herzl, and also Eichmann’s ties with Zionist officials in Europe as well as Palestine, which Arendt notes repeatedly with the same commitment to a nationalist agenda that Herzl himself advanced.⁴⁵ Arendt ridicules Eichmann as trite, banal, and thus anti-intellectual, but these comments are undercut by the material she herself presents. How many US deportation officials today have read Simone Bolivar’s nationalist tracts (analogous to the work of Herzl), much less Immanuel Kant, as did Eichmann?⁴⁶

Crucially, Hilberg’s three-volume work *The Destruction of the European Jews* (1961) opens with several pages of tables that chart political and other violence against Jewish communities since antiquity, placing the Nazi policies in this context and not as an event that is, as Arendt argues, completely new.

Alongside the parallels with other nationalist and racist expatriation, deportation, and miscegenation policies, all of which occurred in the United States and throughout Europe, the other significant challenge for Arendt’s goal of distinguishing the great injustice of genocide from the necessary violence of war, as previously alluded to, was August 6, 1945. If those ordering violence who are the furthest removed from its implementation should be held the “most responsible” for its consequences—the rationale of the Israeli court convicting Eichmann, who never personally killed a single individual, and which Arendt quotes at length and strongly endorses (246–7)—then why did Arendt not demand a war crime trial for President Harry Truman? This is not a question that just emerges in hindsight.⁴⁷ A letter to *Time* magazine, written on August 6, 1945, states:

Sirs, The United States of America has today become the new master of brutal infamy and atrocity. Bataan, Buchenwald, Dachau,

Coventry Lidice were tea parties compared to the horror which we, the people of the United States of America, have dumped on the world in the form of atomic energy bombs. No peacetime applications of the Frankstein monster can ever erase the crime we have committed. We have paved the way for the obliteration of our globe. It is no democracy were such an outrage can be committed without our consent!

(Walter G. Taylor of New York City)⁴⁸

Such a view seems not so different from Arendt's own position in *The Human Condition*, published in 1958, just two years before her Eichmann assignment. She, too, dwells on the horrifying implications of just the potential for the Earth's inhabitants to render their planet permanently toxic, and it would be equally plausible for her to point out that the use of this novel device and this novel context would require elites carry forward the message of Mr. Taylor, precisely to prevent the atomic bomb—far more threatening to humanity than any gas chambers, much less machine gun fire—from further use.

And yet Arendt ultimately finds that Eichmann, not Truman, is the person unworthy to share her world. The 1958 work focuses on the novelty of the atomic age, whereas in 1961 Arendt evokes the emergence of genocide, a project she claims was entirely separate from the war, and even in tension with it. Arendt quotes Churchill on the implications of the “blotting out of whole peoples, the ‘clearance’ of whole regions of their native populations” as “crimes that ‘no conception of military necessity could sustain’” and that were, Arendt emphasizes, “independent of the war.”⁴⁹ She further explains that

what had prevented the Nuremberg Tribunal from doing full justice to this crime was not that its victims were Jews but that the Charter demanded that this crime, which had so little to do with war that its commission actually conflicted with and hindered the war's conduct, was to be tied up with the other crimes.⁵⁰

Prior to the United Nation's convention on genocide, ratified in 1951, Arendt claimed no punishment under international law was available if government officials committed massacres for no reason other than the targets' racial, ethnic, or religious identities and not any alleged crimes.

The bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima were advertised as part of the effort to force the emperor to surrender, a position Arendt stakes out despite copious contemporaneous evidence to the contrary.⁵¹ Arendt inferred this rationale allowed Truman to target major cities for annihilation and still escape prosecution as a war criminal: “[T]echnical developments in the instruments of violence had made the adoption of ‘criminal’

warfare inevitable.”⁵² Arendt is claiming that aerial bombardments, and of course the atom bomb, inherently required the foreseen deaths of civilians, which was a violation of the Geneva Convention. But she asserts that these actions, for which the president and officers go unpunished because “only those outside all military necessities, where a deliberate inhuman purpose could be demonstrated” could be prosecuted.⁵³ Truman might evoke a plausible “military necessity” for his order. Eichmann, Arendt claims, could not. This is striking. In 1958 Arendt warns that the atomic age had destroyed the Archimedean point from which we might experience a world separate from our control as a vantage point for meaningful, independent perspective on ourselves. In 1961, Arendt effectively surrenders her independent judgment to the nuclear age, capitulating to a monstrous *techné* without resistance.

Arendt needed to emphasize the novelty of Auschwitz to explain why she supported convicting Eichmann for crimes against humanity but not Truman. There was, she says, “a clear recognition of the new criminal who commits this crime,” a crime that was different from other war crimes, including the shooting of partisans, the killing of hostages, and the annihilation of native populations “to permit colonization” because the Jewish genocide was a “crime that could not be explained by any utilitarian purpose,” and thus Eichmann's crimes, in “intent and purpose ‘to eliminate forever certain ‘races’ from the surface of the earth’ were unprecedented.”⁵⁴ This scans well, perhaps too well. As we have seen, Arendt herself has acknowledged that the first slaughters were directly associated with the war, and that Eichmann assisted Zionists to organize the transportation of Jews from Europe to Palestine.⁵⁵

To advance the claim of the Nazi's novel Jewish genocide, Arendt struggles with some facts and ignores others. Alert to the fact that Jews in previous epochs had been targeted for simply being Jews and no other reasons, Arendt criticizes the judges in Jerusalem for placing Auschwitz in the context of other pogroms and projects of the nationalist nation-state:

They therefore believed that a direct line existed from the early anti-Semitism of the Nazi Party to the Nuremberg Laws and from there to the expulsion of Jews from the Reich and, finally, to the gas chambers. Politically and legally, however, these were “crimes” different not only in degree of seriousness but in essence.⁵⁶

But it was not only the judges in Jerusalem who made this point. Hilberg had as well, and not only that, he and others later made it clear that the early efforts at rounding up Jews into ghettos and slaughtering them in forests on the city outskirts throughout the Baltic countries and in Poland had nothing to do with gas, but relied on local armed forces coordinating with Rudolf Heydrich's team, of which Eichmann was a part.⁵⁷ Such

actions were indeed in places that had histories of pogroms. Seeing the killing of Jews in these places during World War II as continuous with earlier pogroms is not the grave confusion Arendt suggests.

When Arendt's majestic writing style confronts selected intuitions about politics, the form forces a corrective to sloppy thinking. However, when it comes to war, her lofty certitudes reiterate conventional stupidities as wisdom and thus normalize, naturalize, and thus depoliticize war. Of course wars vary from one and other. But it seems the biggest difference between Hitler's destruction of the East European Jews as well as other Slavs, by the millions and largely in hand-to-hand combat, and slaughters by the conquistadors in the Americas, is that the latter had no literate survivors to historicize their suffering. The nations inhabiting America at the time of Spanish and English conquests only had earthen mounds to mark their prior existence as a people after they were slaughtered to the last individual, their villages razed by the hundreds, and their grave sites made invisible as such following being ransacked for gold and jewelry, according to the priest chronicling Hernando De Soto's expedition.⁵⁸ This is not to diminish by one iota the horrors suffered by Jews or other groups the Nazis targeted, but to propose that thinking and justice require the abolition of all wars and the criminal indictment of anyone responsible for the taking of a human life, that is, the removing of the quotation marks Arendt places around "war crimes" and the condemning of all perpetrators of violence for reasons other than an immediate defense against immediate violence.

Lurking behind Arendt's commitment to the novelty and singularity of the Jewish genocide is her heartfelt if not sentimental commitment to the nation-state, which appears episodically throughout her work, in particular in "We Refugees" (1944) and *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1958), and leads to this unpersuasive analysis, and thus to claims that, returning to Plato, seem to advance a view of friends and enemies that normalize allegiances based on a warfare and thus injustice—claims that Arendt scholars almost unanimously have accepted if not embraced. Arendt argues that rights in the abstract are useless and that only the nation-state can protect these, and only for those individuals who belong to them, specifically endorsing the "pragmatic soundness" of Edmund Burke's claim that the "rights which we enjoy spring 'from within the nation' . . . the 'rights of an Englishman' rather than the inalienable rights of man."⁵⁹ Arendt's defense of the nation-state bears no marks of Arendt's otherwise nuanced, in-depth, and therefore clear-sighted research and analysis, but instead sloppily recapitulates the prevailing intuitions of Burke's age, her age, and our own. Truman is not in Arendt's sightline because the Japanese civilians targeted for his human experiment with mass immolation and vaporization were denizens of a city and their destruction was not an "attack upon human diversity as such, that is upon a characteristic of the 'human status.'"⁶⁰ That is, it is one thing to kill a large number

of people; that is war and that is unfortunate. It is an entirely different and more heinous crime if these deaths aim to eliminate a nationality, a people, as such.

IV. Conclusion: The Banality of War

We can now revisit the questions asked by Plato and the assertions made by Thoreau. What exactly is so horrible about contemplating the disappearance of a people as such, that is, an intergenerational kinship group, in exchange for the persistence of individuals, humanity, and justice?⁶¹ According to Arendt, would the Japanese school child eating lunch deserve less concern because the purpose of her death is a war treaty and not the death of all Japanese? Are nations really so vital to the human condition that they are worth our wars?

Arendt says "yes." Comments on an essay by Karl Jaspers are helpful for understanding the positions she takes in denouncing genocide while allowing war in *Eichmann*. Arendt does not dodge the equation of nations with wars, but acknowledges that the nation entails war and that this is preferable to a "shallow humanity." In "Karl Jaspers: Citizen of the World?" (1968), Arendt attacks her old professor for refashioning Kant's teleology of a federated system of world governance into a political theoretical cause and arguing on behalf of the "actually existing solidarity of mankind"⁶² (93). Arendt disparages Jaspers' objective because it "destroys all national traditions and buries the authentic origins of all human existence"⁶³ (87). Instead of her usual clear-eyed logic, Arendt displays an under-motivated commitment to "national traditions" and not those of non-hereditary communities, such as cities, regions, labor, trade, or professional groups, not to mention transcultural hybrid communities that appropriate and recirculate practices and identities from elsewhere, which is indeed the definition of any nation, whether or not it is honest about its hybridity, contingency, and fluidity. Arendt, alas, will have none of this, but prioritizes (pseudo) national traditions as "authentic," a claim that only mystifies, i.e., locates the nation in a distant ahistorical past, and refuses understanding of either the nation or its traditions.

Arendt mobilizes the myth of authentic nations in service of challenging the humanist, leveling, peace-mongering story Jaspers tells: "It looks as though the historical pasts of the nations, in their utter diversity and disparity, in their confusing variety and bewildering strangeness for each other, are nothing but obstacles on the road to a horribly shallow unity."⁶⁴ Of course, the substantive differences have never been the problem. The purpose of the disparate practices is to provide a purely formal, arbitrary distinction of one people from another. The Hebrew God demands attention to cloven hooves and fabric composition because he says so, and not for any other instrumental reason.⁶⁵ It is precisely the arbitrary and otherwise foolish quality of these traditional practices that reveals the

authenticity of the leader, followers, and alike. Just as it would be insane to demand people kill on behalf of an economic cause, it would be mad for people to only wear wool and not mixed fibers in service of any cause other than revealing a commitment to a vengeful God. Arendt insists that the elimination of the nation would not only produce a thin humanity, but that absent the nation "mankind cannot even technically survive."⁶⁶ Were such a claim on behalf of a belief that were not widely shared by the vast majority of those who already endorse these myths, then Arendt would require at least an argument to sustain this point. But none is forthcoming, much less actual evidence for its support.

Instead of any analysis of the nation, Arendt provides a metonymy that contemporary law and politics have made untenable, at least as a truism if not outright wrong:

just as man and woman can be the same, namely human, only by being absolutely different from each others, so the national of every country can enter this world history of humanity only by remaining and clinging stubbornly to what he is. A world citizen, living under the tyranny of a world empire, and speaking and thinking in a kind of glorified Esperanto, would be no less a monster than a hermaphrodite.⁶⁷

Leaving aside the false empirical claim—that the fall of the nation requires world government, as opposed to administratively autonomous, sovereign states without nations that acquire citizens synchronically, not diachronically—one can imagine as well a queer sexuality, sex, and politics that not only fails to succumb to the pointlessly totalizing heteronormativity Arendt exalts, but affirmatively and infinitely proliferates diverse forms of being well beyond those of a single cis masculinity in contrast with a single cis femininity.⁶⁸

Indeed, the worldview Arendt puts forward is not just one that falls on the sword of current sexual politics, which has the distinction of actually falsifying her metaphor—the demise of the so-called authentic man and woman did not produce the collapse of sexual diversity—but whose absurdity is anticipated as well by none other than Plato. The "Symposium" suggests, at the very least, that the figure of the hermaphrodite is not a eunuch but implies the inherent diversity, if not plu-versity of an eros that Arendt claims is monstrous. Eros has characteristics of masculinity and femininity, and is distinguished not only by ambiguity, but also fluidity between mortal and immortal. In contrast, in ancient Babylon, the boundary between god and comprehension and self-knowledge was not permitted such fluidity when God jealously destroyed those striving for mutual comprehension and omniscience. Arendt is herself leaving the intellectual company of Plato's academy and its pursuit of truth and justice, if not "the academy" more generally, and subordinating herself

alongside the other Israelites to the God of the Hebrew Bible. This angry, vengeful God of war and genocide demands their thoughtless subordination because he says they are different, and chosen, and he is their one God who controls their destiny. "That is why it was called Babel—because there the Lord confused the language of the whole world. From there the Lord scattered them over the face of the whole earth."⁶⁹

Arendt concludes the critique of Jaspers by writing:

The abolition of war, like the abolishment of a plurality of sovereign states, would harbor its own peculiar dangers; the various armies with their old traditions and more or less respected codes of honor would be replaced by federated police forces, and our experiences with modern police states and totalitarian governments, where the old power of the army is eclipsed by the rising omnipotence of the police, are not apt to make us overoptimistic about this prospect.⁷⁰

Does she mean the codes of honor to which the Spanish conquistadors swore before they annihilated the villagers encountered in their scorched-earth massacres? The code of honor of the British forces who settled the colonies with indentured labor from London prisons, which were managed by the same businessmen who issued charters? The code of honor among the US troops that slaughtered the villagers in Mai Lai? Arendt celebrates the American Revolution over the French Revolution, but seems not to attend to the lessons from revolutionaries who were first and foremost citizens and not nationals.⁷¹ Arendt is a more and less self-conscious descendant of Moses and not Socrates, of Hegel, Schmitt, and Heidegger, and not Thomas Paine, who decried all communitarian ideologies for their violations of human peace, large and small, including the cacophony of church bells and minarets.⁷² Arendt seems unwilling to contemplate the possibilities of an individuality that is liberated from the friends and enemies established through and indicated by the nation-states—the ties that the US revolutionaries rejected. Perhaps this is why Thoreau, in one of the least fathomable nation-states in history, a sovereignty named after a geographer from another country, enthusiastically proposes trading a brand name to avoid injustice. His critique of the Mexican-American war, slavery, and the Civil War—which also almost ended the country—suggests that Arendt is the one who is not thinking, and is a cog in the war-mongering machine that may display at any given point new techniques, but whose basic engineering is ancient and largely intact.

Notes

1. Plato, "Socrates' Defense (Apology)," trans. Hugh Tredennick, in *Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (New York: Bollingen, 1961 [c. 399 B.C.]), 32c-d.

2. This work is referred in an English translation as "The Republic." However, Plato's discussion of a politeia or political community does not anticipate the specific types of governments and their theories associated with the modern institutions we today call "republics."
3. Before exploring these tensions, I should note that they are so notable as to raise the question about the integrity of the text producing them, and whether it was indeed all written by the same individual and not added either by fellow co-authors or scribes copying the manuscripts at a later time (Jacob Howland, "Re-Reading Plato: The Problem of Platonic Chronology," *Phoenix* 45 (Autumn 1991); Gerard Boter, *The Textual Tradition of Plato's Republic* (Leiden: Brill, 1996 [rev.]). According to the version based on TK, Plato envisions that *polemos* (war) (a) arises entirely independent of the division between friends and enemies Socrates introduces in Book I; (b) has connotations other than simply armed combat, but also conflict more generally and Plato is calling on the qualities of leadership in disputes such as the dis-cutio of the dialogues; and (c) Plato is going back and forth between the qualities of leadership for an ideal state versus those of a more likely state. Another possibility is that different hands contributed different views on this topic. The one indisputable fact is that there are clear logical and substantive differences between the definition of friends and enemies in Book I, and those that appear later in the *Politeia*.
4. Modern critical scholarship tends to overlook Plato's views on war, or claim that Plato either embraces war (Craig 1996, Baracchi 2002) or assumes its necessity as a thought experiment (Syse 2010). Syse notes: "Although he wrote no single dialogue with war as its explicit, main topic, it should still come with some surprise that there has been so little secondary literature on Plato's treatment of ethical aspects of warfare and indeed of his treatment of warfare as a whole" (2010, 104). For an exception, see Hobbs (2008) and especially Frank (2007). Frank disputes common interpretations that suggest war prepares guardians for philosophy, pointing out that Plato is "underscoring the tensions between the conditions of war and those of philosophy" (450, 454). Frank here and in a later work provides close readings and historical context that challenge long-accepted 20th century readings of *The Republic* (2018).
5. *Politeia*, 460b, 468c; *Peloponnesian Wars* (Book II, line 64).
6. *Politeia*, 543, emphasis added.
7. Other passages in which Plato extols or normalizes friends and enemies based on nationality and not virtue include Book 5, lines 466e, 468d, 469c, 470b.
8. *Politeia*, 470d.
9. *Ibid.*, 471a.
10. *Ibid.*, 471b.
11. Cf. *Ibid.*, 562c–563b.
12. Another reading, consistent with Frank's observation that Plato finds participation in war incompatible with the qualities of judgment necessary for philosophers, is that the so-called "city of pigs"—the way of life Socrates first describes and Glaucon dismisses—provides the contours of the truly ideal city (372d). On this reading, the elucidation of the protocols for guardians and other practices of the city that is second-best, a "fevered state" (372e) does not contradict Socrates' views in Book I and the beginning of Book II. Rather, Plato is narrating the awkward and unpleasant lives of guardians as a means to parody the hardships to which Athenians submit in their hapless pursuit of ease and leisure.
13. *Ibid.*, 327a.
14. *Ibid.*, 328b; *Ibid.*, 331b.
15. The initial attack on war is relatively subtle and metaphorical, while Book VIII overtly blames creditor oligarchs such as Cephalus for the instigation of civil war (*stásis*), the greatest harm that a *politeia* may endure.
16. *Ibid.*, 331b-c.
17. *Ibid.*, 332d.
18. *Ibid.*, 332e.
19. *Ibid.*, 332e–333a. This definition later is contradicted by Socrates defining the enemies of Greeks and non-Greeks as natural (*physis*).
20. *Ibid.*, 334e.
21. *Ibid.*, 334d.
22. *Ibid.*, 335a.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*, 335e, emphasis added.
25. Book 8 carries on a similar analysis (see esp. 566c–e, 567a–c).
26. Car Schmitt, *Concept of the Political: Expanded Edition*, trans. G. Schwab (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 28 note 9.
27. Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace* (Indianapolis: Hackett Press, 1983 [1795]), 351.
28. Socrates references a tyrant's order into war, in apparent contrast with the republican constitution requiring legislative support. However, the democracy theorized for the tyrant's rise also in ancient Athens would have to gain the approval of the generals and the council, at the very least. In this time frame, the council would have been chosen by lot and then, among them, elected a leader and a general. Such mechanisms are different from a republican constitution and the differences may bear further contemplation.
29. G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977 [1807]), §475, pp. 288–9.
30. Henry David Thoreau, "Civil Disobedience," in *Walden and Civil Disobedience* (New York: Penguin, 1983 [1849]), 413.
31. *Ibid.*, 390, emphasis added.
32. Faden, Ruth, *U.S. Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), xxvi.
33. Frank Putnam, "The Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission in Retrospect," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science* 95 (1998), contains copy of directive from President Truman providing imprimatur for ongoing research in Japan to study effects of radiation on survivors of atomic bombs dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, available at www.pnas.org/content/95/10/5426. full. "In 1984, geneticists convened by the Department of Energy discussed how to make best use of data collected according to protocols designed to assess the effects of radiation in the wake of the U.S. bombing Nagasaki and Hiroshima." The idea behind the Alta meeting came from another meeting on March 4 and 5, 1984, in Hiroshima, at which new DNA analytical tools were deemed second highest priority for human mutations research, just behind establishing cell lines from atomic bomb survivors, their progeny, and controls. Cook-Deegan, "The Alta Summit," *Genomics* 5 (December 1984): 662. See also DOE, "DOE Genomics Timeline," with information from 1983 through 2017, available at <http://genomicscience.energy.gov/program/timeline.shtml>.
34. "The firebombing of Dresden had helped set a precedent for the U.S. air force, supported by the American people, to intentionally kill mass numbers of Japanese citizens. The earlier moral insistence on noncombatant immunity crumbled ruing the savage war In Tokyo, during March 9–10, a U.S. air attack killed about 80,000 Japanese civilians. . . . It may even have been

- easier to conduct this new warfare outside Europe and against Japan because its people seemed like 'yellow subhumans' to many rank-and-file American citizens and many of their leaders." Barton Bernstein, "The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered," *Foreign Affairs* 74 (1999): 140. Bernstein's article synthesizes a number of secondary and primary sources supporting his argument that the US aerial bombings that killed hundreds of thousands of civilians were a form of state terrorism used to induce a government's surrender. See Theodore Herzl, *The Jewish State: An Attempt at a Modern Solution to the Jewish Question* (New York: Maccabean Publishing, 1904 [1896]).
35. Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Penguin, 1965 [rev.]), 83.
 36. Yad Vashem: The World Holocaust Memorial Center website, www.yadvashem.org/yv/en/holocaust/resource_center/faq.asp.
 37. "At last, while the two Kings each commanded a Te Deum in his camp, Candide . . . clambered over heaps of dead and dying men and reached a neighboring village, which was in ashes; it was an Abare village which the Bulgarians had burned in accordance with international law. Here, old men dazed with blows watched the dying agonies of their murdered wives who clutched their children to their bleeding breasts; there, disembowelled girls who had been made to satisfy the natural appetites of heroes gasped their last sighs; others, half burned, begged to be put to death. Brains were scattered on the ground among dismembered arms and legs" (F.-M. Arouet Voltaire, *Candide*, ed. Norman Torrey (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1946 [1759]), 7).
 38. Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, 3 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003 [1961]).
 39. Boyer (1985, 183), citing Gallup (1945).
 40. Louis Mumford, "Atom Bomb: 'Miracle' or 'Catastrophe?'," *Air Affairs* (July 1948): 329, cited in Boyer (1986, 284).
 41. Mumford, "Atom Bomb," 329, cited in Boyer (1986, 285).
 42. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, 103; Waltz (1937); Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, 7.
 43. Waltz, *The Nationality of Married Women*, 23, 32, 59; Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, 39; Anti-miscegenation laws remained in place in the United States until the Supreme Court Ruling on (*Loving vs Virginia* in 1967)a.
 44. Amos Elon, *The Pity of it All: A Portrait of the German-Jewish Epoch, 1743–1933* (New York: Henry Holt, 2003), e.g., 124–6; See also Hannah Arendt, "Karl Jaspers: Citizen of the World?," in *Men in Dark Times* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1970) [1968]).
 45. For example, see Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, 40–1, 60, 61, 136, 252.
 46. Bettina Stangneth, *Eichmann before Jerusalem: The Unexamined Life of a Mass Murderer* (New York: Knopf, 2014) makes this point using recently discovered interviews with Eichmann, but it is clear already in Arendt's own texts.
 47. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, 246–7.
 48. Walter Taylor, "Letter to the Editor," *Time Magazine*, August 6, 1945, *Available ProQuest*.
 49. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, 257.
 50. *Ibid.*, 258.
 51. In 1946, the *Herald Tribune* ran an article quoting Fleet Admiral William F. Haley, Jr.: "The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment. It was a mistake to ever drop it. Why reveal a weapon like that to the world when it wasn't necessary?" Halsey asserted that [the scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it. It killed a lot of Japs, but the Japs

had put out a lot of peace feelers through Russia long before" (AP, "Halsey Decries Atom Bombing of Hiroshima: Unnecessary Experiment," *ProQuest Historical Newspapers*, September 9, 1946). Numerous studies then and now have confirmed this. Truman's rationale was no more credible than Hitler's claim that attacking Jews was necessary to confront the world Jewish conspiracy, which of course Arendt rejects.

52. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, 246.
53. *Ibid.*
54. *Ibid.*, 274, 277, 275.
55. E.g., *ibid.*, 59–61.
56. *Ibid.*, 267.
57. Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, vol. 1: 19.
58. Lawrence Clayton, Edward Moore, and Vernon Knight, eds., *The De Soto Chronicles Vol. 1 & 2: The Expedition of Hernando de Soto to North America in 1539–1543* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama, 1995). See also, Mann, 1491.
59. Hannah Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 2d enlarged ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973 [1958]), 290–1, 299.
60. DOE, and see Stevens (2003, 268–9).
61. Stevens (1999, 2009).
62. Arendt, "Karl Jaspers: Citizen of the World?," 93.
63. *Ibid.*, 87.
64. *Ibid.*
65. Leviticus 11:3; Leviticus 19:19.
66. Arendt, "Karl Jaspers: Citizen of the World?," 87.
67. *Ibid.*, 89.
68. Stevens (2009).
69. Genesis 11:19.
70. Arendt, "Karl Jaspers: Citizen of the World?," 93–4.
71. See Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (London: Penguin, 1990).
72. Thomas Paine, "Worship and Church Bells," 1797. <http://thomaspaine.org/essays/french-revolution/worship-and-church-bells.html>.

Bibliography

- AP. "Halsey Decries Atom Bombing of Hiroshima: Unnecessary Experiment." *ProQuest Historical Newspapers*, September 9, 1946: 3A.
- Arendt, Hannah. *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. New York: Penguin, 1965 [rev.].
- . *The Human Condition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958.
- . "Karl Jaspers: Citizen of the World?" In *Men in Dark Times*, 81–94. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1970.
- . *On Revolution*. New York: Penguin, 2006 [1963, 1965 rev.].
- . *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 2nd enlarged ed. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973 [1958].
- Baracchi, Claudia. *Of Myth, Life, and War in Plato's Republic*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001.
- Bernstein, Barton. "The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered." *Foreign Affairs* 74 (1999): 135–52.
- Boter, Gerard. *The Textual Tradition of Plato's Republic*. Leiden: Brill, 1996 [rev.].
- Boyer, Paul. *By the Bomb's Early Light: American thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005.

- Clayton, Lawrence, Edward Moore, and Vernon Knight. *The De Soto Chronicles Vol 1 & 2: The Expedition of Hernando de Soto to North America in 1539–1543*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama, 1993.
- Craig, Leon. *The War Lover: A Study of Plato's Republic*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994.
- Elon, Amos. *The Pity of It All: A Portrait of the German-Jewish Epoch, 1743–1933*. New York: Henry Holt, 2003.
- Faden, Ruth (Chair). *Advisory Committee on U.S. Radiation Experiments: Final Report*. Washington, DC: GPO, 1995. <https://archive.org/details/advisorycommitte00unit>.
- Frank, Jill. *Poetic Justice: Rereading Plato's "Republic"*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018.
- . "Wages of War: On Judgment in Plato's Republic." *Political Theory* 35 (2007): 443–67.
- Hegel, G.W.F. *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977 [1807].
- . *Philosophy of Right*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967 [1821].
- Herzl, Theodore. *The Jewish State: An Attempt at a Modern Solution to the Jewish Question*. New York: Maccabean Publishing, 1904 [1896].
- Hilberg, Raul. *The Destruction of the European Jews*, 3 vols. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003 [1961].
- . *The Politics of Memory: The Journey of a Holocaust Historian*. Chicago: Ivan Dee, 1996.
- Hobbs, Angela. "Plato on War." In *Maiensis: Essays in Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles Burnyeat*, edited by Dominic Scott, 176–94. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Howland, Jacob. "Re-Reading Plato: The Problem of Platonic Chronology." *Phoenix* 45 (Autumn 1991): 189–214.
- Kant, Immanuel. *Perpetual Peace*. Indianapolis: Hackett Press, 1983 [1795].
- Kennedy, Ellen. *Constitutional Failure: Carl Schmitt in Weimar*, 110. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004.
- Locke, John. *A Letter Concerning Toleration*. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983 [1689].
- Loving v. Virginia* 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
- Mann, Charles. *1491: New Revelations of the Americas before Columbus*, 2nd ed. New York: Vintage Books, 2005.
- Mumford, Louis. "Atom Bomb: 'Miracle' or 'Catastrophe'?" *Air Affairs*, July 1948.
- Paine, Thomas. "Worship and Church Bells." 1797. <http://thomaspaine.org/essays/french-revolution/worship-and-church-bells.html>.
- Plato. "The Republic." Translated by Paul Shorey. In *Collected Dialogues of Plato*, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961 [c. 375 B.C.].
- . "Socrates' Defense (Apology)." Translated by Hugh Tredennick. In *Collected Dialogues of Plato*, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961 [c. 399 B.C.].
- Putnam, Frank. "The Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission in Retrospect." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science* 95 (1998): 5426–31.
- Royer, Paul. *By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age*. New York: Pantheon Press, 1986.

- Schmitt, Carl. *Concept of the Political*. Edited by Tracy Strong. Chicago: University of Chicago, 2007.
- Stangneth, Bettina. *Eichmann before Jerusalem: The Unexamined Life of a Mass Murderer*. New York: Knopf, 2014.
- Stevens, Jacqueline. *Reproducing the State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.
- . *States without Nations: Citizenship for Mortals*. New York City: Columbia University Press, 2009.
- Syse, Henrik. "The Platonic Roots of Just Wars Doctrine: A Reading of Plato's Republic." *Diametros* 23 (2010): 104–23.
- Taylor, Walter. "Letter to the Editor." *Time Magazine*, August 6, 1945, Available ProQuest.
- Thoreau, Henry David. "Civil Disobedience." In *Walden and Civil Disobedience*. New York: Penguin, 1983 [1849].
- Thucydides. *The War of the Peloponnesians and Athenians*. New York, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013 [c. 411 BC].
- U.S. Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments. *The Human Radiation Experiments*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Voltaire, F.-M. Arouet. *Candide*. Edited by Norman Torrey. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1946 [1759].
- Waltz, Waldo Emerson. *The Nationality of Married Women: A Study of Domestic Policies and International Legislation*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1937.